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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H. * LIGNELL,. his wife, BURTON M. 
TODD and PHYLLIS h'. TODD, * 
his wife, 
* Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
* 
1-t r;? .' ly'fg 
v. * 
CLIFFORD M. BERG and WILLIAM * Case No. 15001 
R. BERG, a partnership, dba 
BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
* COMPANY, and FIDELITY AND 
DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, 
* 
a corporation, 
* 
Defendants and 
Respondents. * 
ADDITIONAL PAGES 13-18 
Plaintiffs are aware of no provision of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure that would permit Defendants-Respondents 
to file a written supplement to either their oral argument 
or their brief after the day of argument.l If, however, the 
Court is inclined to consider Defendants' "additional pages" 
Plaintiffs submit the following to correct the erroneous con-
elusions contained therein. 
Apparently Defendants, and possibly the Court, miscon-
strued the thrust of Plaintiffs' argument relating to attorney's 
lRule 75(p) (3), U.R.C.P., authorizes corrections, but 
not supplements. 
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fees. In this regard it is essential that the distinction be-
tween attorney's fees awarded as costs (§14-2-3) and attorney's 
fees awarded as damages be kept in mind. Plaintiffs readily 
concede that both Defendants pleaded an entitlement to attor-
ney's fees ("costs") under §14-2-3. (Plaintiffs attached 
copies of Defendants' counterclaims as an appendix to their 
Supplemental Brief.) Plaintiffs contend, however, that §14-2-3 
does not authorize an award of attorney's fees on a Performance 
Bond and thus Defendants would not be entitled to any award of 
attorney's fees, either below or on appeal, based upon that 
statute. Further, Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership) 
was not, as Defendants claim, the principal on that bond. The 
principal was Berg Construction Company (the joint venture). 
Plaintiffs' second argument relates to Defendants' claim 
that they are entitled to pass over to the Plaintiffs those at-
torney's fees awarded to the subcontractors. As Plaintiffs 
understand Defendants' contention they are seeking this pass 
through not as costs under §14-2-3 but as damages for breach 
of contract. 
At oral argument Plaintiffs contended that the action of 
the trial court awarding over the subcontractors' attorney's fees 
was improper since Defendants failed to plead attorney's fees 
as an element of their damages and provided no proof of this 
matter (as damages) at trial; further, the Court2 made none of 
2Defendants erroneously contend in their "additional 
pages" that plaintiffs asserted there were "no • • • findings 
by Defendants-Respondents." 
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the necessary findings that would sustain such an award as 
damages (see Plaintiffs' Supplemental Br;ef), d · ~ an , ~n any event, 
that it was the duty and province of the jury to award defendants 
their damages for the contract breach and it made no award of 
attorney's fees. 
Defendants' argument that they pleaded an entitlement 
to attorney's fees does not solve the rest of the deficiencies 
relating to the award over; nevertheless, it has the potential 
of creating a gross misunderstanding with this Court. 
Even in its supplement, Surety does not contend that it 
made any claim for attorney's fees other than on the Performance 
Bond under §14-2-3. Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership) 
claims, however, that it did make such claims. A review of the 
record indicates that the purported "cross-claim" against the 
owners relating to the Comstock-Murray Electric action was never 
served on plaintiffs or their counsel; rather, it was mailed to 
Ron Spratling, attorney for Murray-Comstock (R. D31); thus, 
clearly there was no properly pleaded claim over that would 
sustain the pass through of the $21,000 in attorney's fees award-
ed the electricians, even if the other shortcomings did not 
exist. 
With relation to the drywallers' claim Berg apparently 
did file a claim over. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss that claim 
prior to trial (R. C780-781). That matter was argued July 16, 
1976, and is reported in pages 25-36 of the Supplemental Trans-
cript (blue backing). Plaintiffs there argued that any kind of 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a pass through to them was improper because a bond had been 
posted which met the requirements of §14-2-2. Defendants 
stated that the cross-claim was intended to deal only with the 
matter of extras under the construction contract and was simply 
filed so that any extras proved by the subcontractors against 
Berg would be considered in the overall accounting in the con-
tract action between the owners and the contractor. In this 
regard Mr. Nebeker stated: 
Mr. Nebeker: "But the cross-claim is simply to say 
that the determination on how much drywall he 
is entitled to and how much the electri-
cian is entitled to goes into the overall 
accounting ••• " (Supp T.32) 
Thereafter the following dialogue took place: 
The Court: As I understand your response, Mr. Nebeker, 
it isn't really you don't take issue with 
what Mr. Tanner has said " 
Mr. Nebeker: "Sure ••• " (Supp T.33) 
Based upon this representation by Defendants) the trial court 
denied Plaintiffs' motion as follows: 
The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
Anything further on that motion, gentlemen? 
The Court is going to deny that motion with 
the explanation given of course that what 
their intention is and the Court I think 
understands it's merely what they want to 
do and I'll limit it to that at the time 
of trial. 
As I understand the Court's ruling, it is 
based upon the proposition that no such 
claim as I was talking about is in fact 
being made therefor? 
3Mr. Beesley concurred in the representations of Mr. 
Nebeker (Supp T.34-35). 
-16-
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The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
R~ght. They don't from their explanation 
glven me, they don't claim any other than 
that entitled to under the contract. 
Thank you. Just want to make that clear. 
(Supp T.36) 
The record shows that Defendants did not intend to pass 
through attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors. If they 
at one time so intended that position was clearly abandoned at 
the pre-trial. 
Defendants' contention that evidence regarding attorney's 
fees was not presented to the jury is true. This was because 
Defendants were not pressing any claim to fees other than as 
costs under §14-2-3. Judge Hall's finding number 11 makes this 
absolutely clear. The only claim for attorney's fees advanced at 
trial by Defendants or the subcontractors was under §14-2-3 which 
does not contain any provision that would authorize a pass 
through. 
In reviewing the record in preparation of this response 
one additional fact of interest was discovered. 
On August 15, 1975, Comstock and Murray Electric filed 
an Amended Verified Complaint wherein they alleged in Paragraphs 
2-5 that a joint venture existed between Clifford M. Berg, 
William R. Berg and Frank c. Berg and that the joint venture 
was the general contractor on the Incline Terrace Project. In 
response thereto Surety, by answer of December 23, 1975, admitted 
the allegations contained in Murray-Comstock's Paragraphs 2-5 
and only took exception to the stated contract amount (R. C335); 
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therefore, Surety's contention at trial and on appeal that there 
was no joint venture should be precluded by its previous admis-
sion that the joint venture did in fact exist. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES 
Earl D. Tanner 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
Lignell and Todd 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H. * 
LIGNELL, his wife, BURTON M. 
TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD, * 
his wife, 
* 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, * 
v. * 
CLIFFORD M. BERG and * 
WILLIAM R. BERG, a partner-
ship, dba BERG BROTHERS * 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and 
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY * 
OF MARYLAlJD, a corporation, 
* 
Defendants and 
Respondents. * 
Case No. 15001 
APPELLANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Pursuant to the notice from the office of the Clerk of 
the Court dated February 8, 1979, respecting further oral argu-
ment in this matter, plaintiffs-appellants submit the following 
Brief on the question of the award of attorney's fees. 
POINT I 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE RECOVERABLE ONLY IN CERTAIN LIMITED 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
It is a long established rule of this Court that attor-
ney's fees are not recoverable within the action itself unless 
expressly provided by contract or authorized by statute. ~ 
v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976); c. G. Hormon Co. v. Lloyd, 
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.. 
28 Utah 2d 112, 499 P.2d 124 (1972); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 v1 
16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953); Marks v. Culmer, 7 utah 163, 25 P, :. 
(1891). This Court, however, apparently espouses the view t:: 
under certain circumstances attorney's fees may be awarded as 
element of consequential damages if incurred in a separate ac 
tion with a third party. Pacific Coast Title Insurance ~.t 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 
906 (1958). Plaintiffs are aware of no provision that would 
require this Court to award attorney's fees, thus even if a 
party might qualify for attorney's fees on appeal, such an a1 
is clearly discretionary with this Court. Downey State Bank 
Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976); Swain v. Sai 
Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d Jl 
(1955). Plaintiffs submit, however, that the criteria foro: 
party to qualify for an award of attorney's fees on appeal is 
very limited and that defendants do not so qualify under the 
facts of this case. In the instant case it is undisputed tha 
none of the contracts between the parties provided for an aw' 
of attorney's fees; therefore, any award must be justified as 
an element of consequential damages or must be based upon a' 
ute. 
POINT II 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY ' S FEES AS AN ELEMENT OF CONSEQf: 
TIAL DAMAGES WOULD NOT ENTITLE DEFENDANTS TO Al.'JY ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
· d in another action; Although attorney's fees ~ncurre ~ 
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in some instances, be a proper element of consequential damages, 
they can only be considered if such fees are reasonable, in-
curred in good faith and with a reasonable probability of success, 
and were reasonably foreseeable by the parties. Pacific coast 
Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., supra; Armstrong 
Construction Co. v. Thompson, 390 P.2d 976 (Wash. 1964); Annot., 
4 A.L.R. 3d 270 (1965). Fees incurred in prosecuting or defending 
a case between the parties cannot, however, be awarded as an 
element of consequential damages. Defendants here, therefore, 
would not be entitled to attorney's fees on appeal since such 
attorney's fees would be "within the action itself" and are clear-
ly precluded by the decisions of this Court. Pacific Coast Title 
Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., supra. 
A. An award of attorney's fees as consequential damages 
below would preclude both Berg and the surety from any award of 
attorney's fees. 
If this Court concludes that the attorney's fees were 
awarded by the trial court as an element of consequential darn-
ages the only portion of those fees that could be sustained a-
gainst the owners would be those awarded to the electrical 
contractor ($21,000.00) and to the drywaller ($11,000.00). The 
award by the trial court to the surety ($21,000.00) and to Berg 
($21,000.00) could not be sustained because such an award would 
be "within the action itself." Even as an element of consequen-
tial damages, however, the assessment against the owners of the 
attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors would be improper 
-3-
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under the facts of this case and the state of the record. 
B. Neither Berg nor the surety pled nor proved 
- a~. 
ney's fees as an element of consequential damages. 
The counterclaims filed by Berg Brothers and the 
suret 
request attorney's fees in the amount of $35,000.00 each under 
the Labor and Material Bond statute, §14-2-3, u .C .A. (Copies 
0
, 
the counterclaims are attached hereto as Appendix pages A-1 an
1 
A-2). Neither of the defendants requested that they be awardee 
the attorney's fees incurred in their suits with the subcontra: 
tors as an element of their damages. Further, there is no 
finding by the trial court in this matter that the fees were 
incurred in good faith. In fact, the record indicates to the 
contrary; the subcontractors, Berg Brothers and the surety 
banded together against the owners (Supp. T.lS). See Bryce 
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 21 F.Supp. 81: 
(D.C.S.C. 1938) (attorney's fees unnecessarily incurred not 
awardable) • There was no finding or evidence which would pern: 
a determination of how much of the time and effort of the attcr 
neys for the drywaller and the electrician was devoted to thei: 
claims against the contractor and the surety and how much of 
their time and effort was devoted to the various claims brough! 
by them against the owners directly. In the absence of such a 
breakdown it is impossible to tell what portion of attorney's '· 
awarded to the subcontractors would be properly included as an 
element of consequential damages had that matter been raised a: 
trial. Further, there is no pleading and no finding bY the tr: 
-4-
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court that the attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors 
against the surety were reasonably foreseeable at the time the 
contract was made.l Pacific Coast Title Ins. co. v. Hartford 
Accident Indemnity Co., supra. 
C. The contract between the owners and the surety 
specifically excludes an award of attorney's fees as an element 
of consequential damages. 
The Labor and Material Bond, as it relates to the obliga-
tion between the surety and the owners, provides: 
"2. The above named Principal and Surety hereby 
jointly and severally agree with the Owner that every 
claimant as herein defined, who has not been paid in 
full before the expiration of a period of ninety (90) 
days after the date on which the last of such claim-
ant's work or labor was done or performed, or mater-
ials were furnished by such claimant, may sue on this 
bond for the use of such claimant, prosectue the suit 
to final judgment for such sum or sums as may be justly 
due claimant, and have execution thereon. The Owner 
shall not be liable for the payment of any costs or 
expenses of any such suit." (emphasis added) (See 
Page A-5 in the appendix to the Appellants' Brief 
where the Labor & Material Payment Bond is set forth 
in its entirety.) 
It is apparent, therefore, that the only contract between 
the surety and the owners respecting attorney's fees required 
the surety to save the owners harmless from all costs and ex-
penses in suits brought by materialmen and laborers under that 
bond. This indicates that the surety, the owners and the prime 
contractor all contemplated the possibility that there would 
be costs and expenses incurred in suits by subcontractors and 
1 It is submitted that in this case it would have been 
impossible to foresee that the bonding company would refuse 
to pay claims which it believed to be fair and just and proper 
in amount. 
-5-
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specifically provided in the bond that the owners would not 
be liable for such. Therefore, even if this Court can igMn 
the fact that no request was made below by defendants for an 
award of attorney's fees as consequential damages, no findings 
were made by the trial court respecting that issue and no 
findings were made by the court which would support an award 
of consequential damages, the clear language of the contract 
between the parties would preclude such an award and should be 
controlling with respect to that issue. 
If this Court were inclined to the belief that the con· 
tractor and surety should be entitled to recover as consequen-
tial damages the attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors 
below, this cause would have to be remanded for evidence and 
findings on (1) the good faith of the surety in requiring Ue 
subcontractors to go to trial on their claims under the bond, 
(2) the portion of subcontractors' time spent pursuing the 
bond claims as distinguished from that spent pursuing the man)' 
causes of action pleaded by the subcontractors against the 
owners, 2 all of which were successfully defended by the owners, 
who received judgment of "no cause," and (3) the foreseeabilit 
of the surety's action in refusing to pay subcontractors evu 
though surety believed the subcontractors' claims to be merit· 
orious. 
2uo evidence was adduced at the trial on this alloca· 
tion, the award was for all services rendered, without 
pro-rating. 
-6-
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POINT III 
SECTION 14-2-3, U.C.A., DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BELOW OR ON APPEAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THIS CASE. 
Even if this Court concludes that the award of attor-
ney's fees below was based upon §14-2-3, and was not an element 
of consequential damages, defendants still would not be entitled 
to attorney's fees on appeal. 
A. Under statutes such as §14-2-3, U.C.A., no award 
can be made for attorney's fees incurred on appeal. 
A recent Florida case has met head-on the question of 
the award of attorney's fees for services of attorneys on appeal. 
Section 84w291 of the Florida Statutes, a statute similar to 
our §38-1-18, u.c.A., states: 
"In any action brought to enforce a lien under 
this chapter, the prevailing party shall be enti-
tled to recover a reasonable fee for the services 
of his attorney, to be determined by the court which 
shall be taxed as part of his costs." 
The District Court of Appeals for the First District in John T. 
Wood Homes, Inc. v. Air Control Products, Inc., 177 So.2d 709 
(Fla. 1965), held that such a statute would not permit the allow-
ance of attorney's fees for services on appeal. This holding 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Sunbeam Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Upthegrove, 316 so.2d 34 (Fla. 1975), citing 
inter alia, a united States Supreme Court case which held that 
the "American rule" respecting the award of attorney's fees was 
that, since statutes providing for the award of attorney's fees 
-7-
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were in derogation of the common law, they should be strict), 
construed. The Supreme Court of Florida held: 
"[2] This Court has consistently held that the 
award of attorney's fees is in derogation of 
the common law and that statutes allowing for 
the award of such fees should be strictly con-
strued. Weathers, for Use and Benefit of Ocean 
Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Cauthen, 152 Fla. 
420, 12 So.2d 294 (1943); Great American Indem-
nity Co. v. Williams, et al., 85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 
1956); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d l (Fla. 1968); 
Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968). See 
also Jackson v. Hatch, supra. 
"[3] We agree with petitioner that the District 
Court erred in awarding attorney's fees on appeal 
to respondent since Section 713.29 (formally §84.2911 
does not expressly authorize the award of attorney's 
fees on appeal and we would adopt the reasoning of 
the District Court of Appeals, First District, in 
John T. Wood Homes, Inc. v. Air Control Products, 
Inc., that ' ••• the statute by not specifically 
setting out attorney's fees incurred on appeal would 
not encompass the allowance of such a fee.' Accord, 
Babe's Plumbing, Inc. v. Maier, supra. See, Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, et al., 
421 u.s. 240, 95 s.ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), 
Supreme Court of the United States, opinion filed 
May 1 2 , 1 9 7 5 • " 
There have been numerous cases in Utah respecting the 
award of attorney's fees to the "successful party" under 
§38-1-18 relating to mechanic's liens foreclosure. None ap-
pear to deal with the award of attorney' s fees for services c· 
appeal. See, e.g. , Palombi v. D & C Builders, 2 2 Utah 2d 29i, 
452 P.2d 325 (1969). 
Plaintiffs submit that when dealing with attorney's 
fees awardable by statute the "Florida rule" is correct and 
· t r stat:· 
that the provisions of §38-l-18, and those of its SlS e 
§14-2-3, relating to labor and rna terial claims under the JJonc: 
-8-
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statute, should be strictly construed as in derogation of the 
common law and that no attorney's fees for services in an 
appeal should be taxable as costs on appeal in the absence of 
express statutory authority to that effect. In cases involving 
contract provisions for attorney's fees, however, such an award 
for appellate services would be a matter of the discretion of 
the court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate Board, supra (attor-
ney's fees denied). Of course, in this case there is no such 
contractual provision. 
B. An award of attorney's fees below based on §14-2-3 
would preclude the pass through of the subcontractors' fees to 
the owners. 
If the award of attorney's fees below was based upon the 
bond statute, a conclusion which plaintiffs contend cannot be 
supported by the record of this case since the action between 
plaintiffs and defendants surety and contractor was not an action 
based upon a Labor and Material Payment Bond but, rather, was 
based upon a Performance Bond (see Appellants' Brief, pp. 46-58 
and Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 29-34), the award over of the 
attorney's fees with relation to the electrical subcontractor and 
the drywaller must be reversed. There is no provision in that 
statute, nor any other, for the contractor and the surety to 
recover over against the owners the attorney's fees awarded to 
the subcontractors whom they failed and refused to pay. Such 
recovery over can only be obtained by pleading and proving a 
claim for consequential damages as has been discussed above. 
-9-
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statutes to Performance Bonds would be injudicious. 
Plaintiffs have previously argued in their Brief that 
the attorney's fees provisions of §14-2-3 should not be ex-
panded to include suits by an Owner against his prime contrac: 
and surety under a construction contract and Performance Bone, 
Such an expansion would be in derogation of the common law ru: 
and subject to the rule that statutes providing for attorney'' 
fees should be construed strictly. 
Further, this Court should be particularly careful no: 
to write into the contractor's bond statute or the Performance 
Bond contract a provision permitting the successful party~~ 
suit on a Performance Bond to recover attorney's fees. This 
would open the doors for any successful owner bringing suit 
on a Performance Bond to recover, in addition to the principal 
obligation, its attorney's fees. The bonding companies have 
specifically left such a provision out of their contract. ~ 
such provision appears in the statutes and even if it did it 
would be subject to strict construction. Nonetheless, ilie 
trial court made an award of attorney's fees as part of the 
costs in this case. This award is erroneous and should ~ 
reversed and there should be no attorney's fees award to eith' 
the appellant or respondent for the services of its attorneys 
below or on appeal. 
combini In addition, the mere fact that the cases were 
. . t. on bet•' for trial would not justify obliterating the d~st~nc ~ 
-10-
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the essential elements of the causes of action pursued by the 
subcontractors and the claim made on the Performance Bond and 
the principal contract between the owners and the prime con-
tractor. 
D. The owners were awarded their costs against the 
subcontractors. 
As has been noted, under §14-2-3 attorney's fees are 
awarded to the successful party and taxed as costs. The owners 
were the "successful party" in all of the suits brought by the 
subcontractors against them and the trial court awarded the 
owners their costs against those subcontractors. As this Court 
recognized a long time ago, in any lawsuit there can only be 
one "prevailing party" so far as costs are concerned. Checketts 
v. Collins, 78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d 950 (1931). Thus, it would be 
improper now,_ under the guise of the bonding statute, to assess 
against the "prevailing party" i.e. the owners, those attorney's 
fees awarded as costs to the subcontractors in their suits with 
Berg and the surety. 
E. The clerk's notice appears to preclude an award 
under §14-2-3. 
The notice prepared by the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
requests information on the issue of the award of attorney's 
fees as distinguished from those assessed as damages. Since an 
award under §14-2-3 is not assessed as damages but is taxed as 
costs, plaintiffs assume that the real area of inquiry by this 
Court is that of attorney's fees as consequential damages and 
not attorney's fees as costs under §14-2-3. If so, 
-11-
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defendants-respondents clearly would not be entitled to fees 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
,......Jer a fffO p_r ia/t.. e. ire u ,sr-fit t.S1 
The contractor and surety mayll'be entitled to an awar: 
below of attorney's fees as consequential damages; however, 
there is no pleading nor proof relating to that matter at th: 
point in the litigation. In addition, such a theory of reco 
ery would clearly preclude an award of attorney's fees to U; 
contractor and surety below and would preclude an award of a: 
torney' s fees on appeal. Even if the award of attorney's fe, 
below is held to have been based upon the statute, §14-2-3, • 
further award of attorney's on appeal would be precluded by 
the Florida rationale and the pass-through of the subcontrac·. 
or's fees (some $32,000.00) as "costs" would have to be reve: 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that no theory that h 
appeared in the case so far would sustain an award of additr 
fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES 
Earl D. Tanner 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
Lignell and Todd 
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the e.:.\::ctri<.:J.l .5ubc:ontr.:..c:tcrs, 
qu!.t and 'valk vtf the joO and delJ.•; the const:::-uc:ior. oE ·:h.c 
Plaint::..ffs have f<liled co pay in Euil for t!"le 'Nark t:~crfor:r.cd and :nat~rial 
furnished Jy said subcontr.J.ctor;;, all of whicn 3.~ts of interference ,.,ere 
contrary to the terms of the .:ontract and caused ti1e said subconcractors 
<;o file 5uit ag.:.1inst the plaintiffs and also upon c:-te pay:n.;nc bor:.d issue.i 
by this :.:iefendan:. D~£endant deni~s th~ al.!.egatio:1s of ?.lrJ.grnphs 12 a.nd. 
13. 
COUNTERC:O.\IC! 
Defendant complains of che plaintiffs c:.. Keith Lignel!. ana 
:-farl.on H. Lignell, his wife, and Burton ~!. Todd and ?hylii..:; ;.;, Tocili, his ·.o~ife, 
and alleges J.S fallows: 
1. Defendant incorporates ~erein its answers c:o para:;raphs 12. 
and 13 oi Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action. 
2. Defendant furnished its ?erformance and pay~enc bone!. 
pursuant to Chapc.ar 2 of Title 1.:0, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The :H:acuc.~ 
provides as follows: 
In any action Jroughc upon che bond provic!eci f~r 
under ~his chapter the successful pc.rcy shall be ~ntitled 
to recover a reasonable ac.tornoe,•' s feoe co be fixed Jv 
the court, which shall be c.axeci, as coscs in ti':.e acti~n. 
(14-2-3) 
J. Plaintiffs still owe the subcontracc.ors Copiaga J.nd Gree!\· •. :ood 
and Comstock Electric and ~turray E:lectric a sum of money ior the ·,..rork 
performed by said suOcontractors on che Incline Terrace .\parc.me!\C.S, and 
plainc.iffs furc.her owe Berg Broc.hers Construction Company a surn. of ~oney 
for the -.... ark performed by the g.::1eral conc.raccor J.S allee;~d in their 
separate Complaints filed herein. 
4.. Pursuant co the provisions of 14-2-J, chis d~~e!l.c!o.n~ is 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys 1 f~e to b~ fix~d by c.h.c. :our:: 
r.Jhich defendant J.ll~ges to be tne sur.~ of $35,000 for :JCcurnl.lys' ~·~~~ .. md 
expenses. 
r,·!HEREFORE, defendant Fid~licy and D~posit Cvmpany of ~!.:1:yl .. .md 
CounterclaLrn of Sure~y 
A-1 
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as ;ollows: 
1, Defe::.dan~s lnccr;.crata r.crel:l. t:1elr answers to ;Jarag:a~n5 . 
Constructio:l Cor..pa;-.y c..s ;:r:.:-;.c:..pais 0:1 :.1e :::e:-:or:-:-.a:-.ce and ;:.aywe:-.t::· 
·: 1953, The stat\.4te ;Jrov:..das as :o.~.lows: 
11 In any act1on ~rou:;:~:-.: :..!(:0:1 L~e ':.lonG ::rovj,ded :or under thls 
chapter t.-.a .5t...;.c;:ess::..;.l. _:.o.r:y s:1ad be e;-.tj,t.aC. :o recover a 
reasonable at:c~:-.ey 's :ae ':o ':Je :~eC. ':Jy ::-.a co~, wh1ch 
shaH be taxed 55 costs :.:-. :r.e acr..o.cn. 
( 14-2-3)" 
3, Plaintlifs a<: the ::resent t:ir..e ewe ::-.a s~Dconr.ractors Co~L.·;: 
Greenwood and Comstoc.< 'Slactr;.c and :VIurray Zlec:ti.c a sum of wor.e(: 
I work. ~erformed by said silbcontractors on ::--,a I:1cl:..ne :'errace Apart::-.a~.:: 
" ~~ pla1ntiifs further owe Berg 3rot:-tersco::structlon Co;-r-.?any a s~,;.:n of c.oi.: 
,, 
I[ ]i work t:leriormed by the ger.aral ~or.t:actcr as alle~ed ::1 i)r:.c: Co:n?:a::.:; 
:; claims and Countarc~ai:T.s :!.lad :.-..era:.n, 
li 
,I 
'I 
I! 
4, ?ursuant to t:,e ;:rovlSlons oi l_,-2-3, ::.-..ese defendar.ts ;.:i· 
:ito recover a reasona~la a :t.:rneys' :ee 
I· 
to :,a f.l..x:ed. by the co~ wh.lc~~·:~ 
:·i allege to be the S'l:n of $35 ,ceo. 00 :cr attorr.eys' ;ees and expenses, 
Defendants inccr;crate here1n all af:u-:r.at:ve deienses, cross· 
: countercla1ms wr.1c:. .-.ave ;::::rev:ous1y jeen al~cged aga1nst ::1e ~lali'.::::. 
:· L1gc.ell and Todd, 
A-2 
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